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RESTRICTED JUDICIAL REVIEW PROVISIONS OF THE 
CLEAN AIR ACT - DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS OR 
INDISPENSABLE TO EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION? 
Mary Parker Squiers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act of 19701 in the wake of grow-
ing national concern over the quality of our country's air resources. 2 
Since its enactment, the Act has created a great deal of controversy 
between business and environmental groups. Arguably, the legisla-
tion may impose regulations which are difficult or even impossible 
to meet or which, if complied with, would seriously curtail or even 
stop economic growth. Yet, the fact that significant air pollution 
still exists may indicate that the Environmental Protection Agency 
* Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW 
I The Clean Air Act of 1970, formerly at 42 U.S.C. §§1857 et seq. (1976), was amended, 
effective August 7, 1977, and is now the Clean Air Amendments of 1977, codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§§7401 et seq .. The Supreme Court decision in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 
U.S. 275 (1978), cites to the provisions of the Act prior to their recodification at 42 U.S.C. 
§§7401 et seq .. Therefore, reference in this article to specific provisions of the Clean Air Act 
will be provided to the appropriate citation both before and after the 1977 Amendments. 
2 See e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 5356. The Clean Air Act is a complex piece of legislation designed predominantly 
"to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public 
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." Section 101 of the Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7401. The legislative history reveals 
the sense of urgency with which the Clean Air Act was enacted. The House Report on the 
Clean Air Act points out that pollution control, since the enactment of the Air Quality Act 
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90·148, 81 Stat. 485, had been inadequate. Congress, therefore, was urged 
to adopt new legislation which would make possible a more expeditious imposition of emission 
standards and provide more effective enforcement of these standards by state and federal 
agencies. The House Report explained that the purpose of such legislation was to "speed up, 
expand, and intensify the war against air pollution in the United States with a view to 
assuring that the air we breathe throughout the nation is wholesome once again." H.R. REP. 
No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5356. 
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(EPA) has moved too slowly in enforcing the Act's mandate to con-
trol air pollution. 
In 1978 the Supreme Court addressed certain aspects of the con-
troversy surrounding the Clean Air Act in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. 
United States,3 a case involving a small wrecking company's alleged 
failure to comply with EPA regulations controlling the emission of 
asbestos. One question before the Court concerned whether a defen-
dant in a criminal proceeding to enforce a regulation promulgated 
under the Act may challenge the validity of the regulation itself. 
The ability of a defendant to mount such a challenge would gravely 
affect the enforcement of the Act since any enforcement brought by 
the EPA would automatically widen from an investigation of the 
defendant's actions to an investigation of EPA's actions in issuing 
the regulation. 
This article will examine the due process implications of the crim-
inal sanctions under the Clean Air Act. The first section discusses 
the provisions of the Clean Air Act relating to the promulgation, 
judicial review, and enforcement of emission standards. The second 
section examines the Supreme Court's opinion in Adamo and its 
relationship to another case interpreting a statute with judicial re-
view provisions similar to those in the Clean Air Act. The final 
portion of the article presents the due process issues involved in 
denying a defendant the ability to assert certain defenses in an 
enforcement proceeding, and suggests possible changes in the Act's 
review procedures in order to protect a defendant's due process 
rights. 
II. ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEDURES 
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
To accomplish the Clean Air Act's stated purpose of improving 
the quality of the air in the United States, Congress empowered the 
EPA to investigate the sources of air pollution and to promulgate 
regulations designed to abate or eliminate them. Moreover, Con-
gress authorized the EPA to institute administrative or judicial en-
forcement proceedings against violators. However, Congress also 
subjected EPA's authority to issue regulations to judicial review by 
the courts. This elaborate legislative scheme seeks to balance the 
needs for pollution control against the economic needs of the nation. 
• 434 U.S. 275 (1978). 
----------- --
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A. Promulgation of Standards 
The Administrator of the EPA has authority to promulgate stan-
dards to attain the safest level for emission of hazardous air pollu-
tants4 and to attain national primary and secondary ambient air 
quality levels.5 Section 112 of the Act8 authorizes the Administrator 
to control the emission of hazardous air pollutants on a national 
leveU The Administrator has initial responsibility for publishing a 
list which includes each hazardous pollutant for which he intends 
to establish an emission standard.s Within 180 days after inclusion 
of a pollutant on the list, the Administrator must publish proposed 
regulations establishing emission standards together with a notice 
of a public hearing to be held within thirty days.s Not later than 180 
days after the publication of the list, the Administrator must pre-
scribe emission standards at the level which, in his judgment, pro-
tects....the public health "unless he finds, on the basis of information 
presented at such hearings, that a pollutant clearly is not a hazard-
ous air pollutant."lo Any standards established pursuant to this 
section become effective upon promulgation. II After the effective 
date of any emission standard, new and stationary sources are sub-
ject to the prohibitions. 12 
The Clean Air Amendments of 197713 added a new subsection to 
• Section 112, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7412. 
• Section 109, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7409. 
• Section 112, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7412. 
7 Id. 




12 Section 112(c), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(c)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7412(c). The term 
"new source" means "a stationary source the construction or modification of which is comm-
enced after the Administrator proposes regulations under this section establishing an emis-
sion standard which will be applicable to such source." Section 112(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(a) 
(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7412(a). The term "stationary source" means "any building, 
structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." Section 
111(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-6(a)(3)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7411(a)(3). Therefore, no 
person may construct a new source which will emit a hazardous air pollutant in excess of these 
standards. Existing sources are similarly forbidden from emitting a pollutant in excess of any 
standards. However, the standards do not apply to these stationary sources until ninety days 
after their effective date. The President has authority to exempt any source from compliance 
with Section 112 if it is determined that the technology needed to implement such standards 
is not available and the operation of the source is required for reasons of national security. 
Section 112(c), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(c)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7412(c). 
13 Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, §110, 91 Stat. 685 (codified at 42 
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Section 112 relating to the use of procedural and operational stan-
dards for hazardous pollutants when, in the judgment of the Admin-
istrator, it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce emission standards 
in particular situations. 14 Such a standard, when promulgated, must 
include any requirements necessary to assure the proper operation 
and maintenance of the pollution control procedure or equipment. 
Whenever it becomes feasible to promulgate and enforce one of 
these operational standards in terms of an emission standard, the 
standard must be changed to an emission standard. It should be 
noted that subsection (c), which outlines prohibited acts under Sec-
tion 112, does not discuss violations or work practice or operational 
standards; rather, it prohibits only violations of emission stan-
dards}5 
The procedure followed by the Administrator in promulgating 
national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards is 
somewhat different from that set forth for the promulgation of haz-
ardous pollutants. II First, the Administrator must issue a list of air 
pollutants which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollu-
tion and which may endanger the public health or welfare. 17 The 
Administrator then issues air quality criteria for each air pollutant 
on the list. IS These criteria must reflect the latest scientific knowl-
edge in indicating the identifiable effects of such a pollutant on the 
public health and welfare which may be expected from the presence 
of this pollutant in the air, in varying quantities. II Concurrent with 
the issuance of these criteria, the Administrator, after consultation 
with appropriate advisory committees and federal agencies, issues 
information concerning air pollution control techniques for each of 
these pollutants. 20 
The Administrator publishes proposed national primary and sec-
ondary air quality standards simultaneously with the issuance of 
these criteria and information.21 After a reasonable time for inter-
U.S.C. §§7401 et seq.). 
" Id. §110. 
15Id. 
18 Sections 108 and 109, 42 U.S.C. §§1857c-3, 1857c-4 (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. 
§§7408, 7409. 
17 Section 108(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-3(a)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7408(a). 
18Id. 
II Id. 
20 Id. §108(c). 
II Section 109, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7409. 
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ested persons to offer written comments, but in no case later than 
ninety days after the initial publication of the proposed standards, 
the Administrator promulgates the proposed standards. These may 
include any modifications he deems appropriate. 22 
These promulgated standards are instrumental in the formation 
by each state of its implementation plan. Each state is charged with 
the responsibility of formulating a plan consistent with these stan-
dards and with other specified requirements. 23 The Administrator 
must approve such a plan if it meets all the requirements and if the 
plan was adopted by the state after reasonable notice and hearing. 24 
Thus, the Administrator promulgates standards for hazardous 
pollutants as well as for nonhazardous pollutants after providing 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing. Yet, the scope of the hear-
ings held for hazardous and nonhazardous pollutants differs. In the 
promulgation of standards to control the emission of hazardous pol-
lutants, the hearing concerns only the question of whether the par-
ticular pollutant for which a standard is being developed is, in fact, 
hazardous. On the other hand, the hearings held during the formu-
lation of the primary and secondary ambient air quality standards 
are not similarly restricted in scope, so that comments may be sub-
mitted on any question raised during the development of those stan-
dards. 
B. Judicial Review of Standards 
Judicial review of the action of the Administrator in promulgating 
standards for hazardous and nonhazardous pollutants is addressed 
in Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act.25 Prior to the enactment of 
22 [d. 
23 Section 110, 42 u.s.c. §1857c-5(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7410, sets out the re-
quirements for each state implementation plan as well as the Administrator's responsibilities 
in approving and publishing such plans . 
.. [d . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(b). 
This section reads, in relevant part: 
(1) A petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any national 
primary or secondary ambient air quality standard, any emission standard or requirement 
under section 112 [42 USC § 7412], any standard of performance or requirement under 
section 111 [42 USC § 7411], ... or any other nationally applicable regulations promul-
gated, or final action taken, by the Administrator under this Act may be filed only in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. A petition for review of the 
Administrator's action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan under 
section 110 or section 111(d) [42 USC §§ 7410, 7411(d)], ... under section 112(c) [42 
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that Act, the nation's pollution control laws seemed to encourage 
administrative delay before initiating court action.28 Moreover, once 
the parties entered court, the statutes provided several opportuni-
ties to prolong the judicial proceedings almost to the point of a de 
novo review of the issues previously decided on the administrative 
level.27 Through Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, Congress at-
tempted to restructure the existing review procedure to make it 
usc § 7412(c)], under section 113(d) [42 USC § 7413(d)], ... or any other final action 
of the Administrator under this Act (including any denial or disapproval by the Adminis-
trator under title I) which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the United 
States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit. Notwithstanding the preceding sent-
ence a petition for review of any action referred to in such sentence may be filed only in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia if such action is based 
on a determination of nationwide scope or effect and if in taking such action the Adminis-
trator finds and publishes that such action is based on such a determination. Any petition 
for review under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days from the date notice of 
such promulgation, approval, or action appears in the Federal Register, except that ifsuch 
petition is based solely on grounds arising after such sixtieth day, then any petition for 
review. under this subsection shall be filed within sixty days after such grounds arise. 
(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been obtained 
under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings 
for enforcement. 
The Clean Air Amendments of 1977 altered this subsection, originally enacted in 1970, 42 
U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(1976), by adding, among other things, a provision respecting require-
ments under sections 111 and 112, 42 U.S.C. §§7411 and 7412, and by increasing from thirty 
days to sixty days the period during which the petition must be filed. 
2. The enforcement procedures of the 1963 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 
are found in §5, 77 Stat. at 396. First, a conference of governmental units and air pollution 
control agencies having jurisdiction over the alleged polluter was to be held. The recommen-
dations of this conference were then to be issued. If no abatement had occurred within six 
months after the issuance of the conference recommendation, a public hearing was to be held. 
On the basis of evidence presented at such a hearing, the federal government could request 
the Attorney General to bring a civil suit to secure abatement of the pollution. 
The enforcement procedures of the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 
485, are found in § 108, 81 Stat. at 491. This Act used the air quality standards approach later 
adopted in the Clean Air Act of 1970. Under the Air Quality Act of 1967, each state had to 
establish its own air quality standards and a plan for their implementation. Failure to meet 
the air quality standards of a particular region resulted in notification to the affected state 
and the polluter. If such failure did not cease 180 days from the date of such notification, 
the Attorney General could have been requested to bring a suit on behalf of the United States 
to secure abatement. 
27 See, e.g., 1963 Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 88-206, §5(g), 77 Stat. 398, "The court, giving 
due consideration to the practicability of complying with such standards . . . and to the 
physical and economic feasibility of securing abatement of any pollution proved, shall have 
jurisdiction to enter such judgment .... " See also, Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 
90-148, §108(c), 81 Stat. 493, "The court, giving due consideration to the practicability and 
to the technological and economic feasibility of complying with such standards, shall have 
jurisdiction to enter such judgment .... " 
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genuinely effective.28 
.. The language of Section 307(b) made its first appearance in the conference committee 
bill, but with little explanation as to its purpose. See, H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 35, 57 (1970). The language of Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, however, is almost 
identical to the review provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA). 33 
U.S.C. §§1252 et seq. (1976) at §1369(b). Subsection (b)(l) of the FWPCA refers to obtaining 
review of the Administrator's action in specific circumstances in the appropriate court of 
appeals. Application for such review must be made within ninety days of the Administrator's 
action. Subsection (b)(2) of the FWPCA is worded identically to Section 307(b)(2) of the 
Clean Air Act. Since the legislative history of the FWPCA is more revealing than that of 
Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act, an examination of the history of the FWPCA is helpful 
in indicating Congressional intent in changing the judicial review scheme of federal air pollu-
tion legislation. 
The legislative history of the FWPCA suggests that Congress was concerned with the 
efficiency and consistency of administrative and judicial actions when applying the judicial 
review procedure. The Congress noted that, because many administrative actions are national 
in scope and require even and consistent national application, judicial review in the court of 
appeals is appropriate. In Senate Report 414, S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted 
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668 at 3750-3751, the Senate stated its preference 
that all review be in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. However, the Confer-
ence Report, CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 3776, 3825, adopted the provision allowing review in any of the courts of appeals, 
depending upon the scope of the particular regulation under review. The Congress also noted 
that, in order to maintain the time sequences of the FWPCA, review must be commenced 
within a certain time. The Senate Report, S. REp. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
[1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668, indicates the Senate's preference for a thirty day 
time period for review, while the Conference Report, CONF. REp. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d 
Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3776, demonstrates Congress' intent 
to adopt a ninety day time limit. 
With respect to the exclusivity of the judicial review procedure, the Senate noted that the 
courts have held that, even in matters committed to agency discretion, preclusion of judicial 
review is not to be lightly inferred. See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 
[1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 3668. This Report notes: 
Since precluding review does not appear to be warranted or desirable, the bill would 
specifically provide for such review within controlled time periods. Of course, the person 
regulated would not be precluded from seeking such review at the time of enforcement 
insofar as the subject matter applies to him alone. 
1d. at 3750. 
Therefore, the section, as adopted by both houses, not only explicitly precluded judicial 
review except within a specified time period, but also forbade review of any action which 
could have been reviewed in the court of appeals in an enforcement proceeding at the district 
court level. The Conference Report states: 
The conferees intend that this provision limit the availability of judicial review of a 
standard or requirement where judicial review was available at the time the standard or 
requirement was established. The conferees do not intend to, in any way, affect the right 
of a party for which judicial review was not available. 
CONF. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
3776,3825. 
Presumably, the same necessity for efficient and uniform decision-making that prompted 
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Under Section 307(b)(1), a party challenging emission standards 
must file a petition seeking review in the court of appeals.2• Regula-
tions or orders of national applicability are challenged in the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, while regulations or orders 
of a local or regional nature are challenged in the court of appeals 
for the appropriate circuit.30 However, regardless of which court the 
action is brought in, the party seeking review must do so within 
sixty days after the Administrator makes the determination or pro-
mulgates the regulation at issue.31 Waiver of this sixty day tim_e 
limit is possible only if the petition for review rests solely on grounds 
arising after the sixtieth day,32 in which case a petition for review 
must be filed within sixty days after the new grounds arise.as 
Section 307(b)(2) provides that any action which could have been 
challenged in the courts of appeals under Section 307(b)(1) may not 
be raised as a defense in any civil or criminal enforcement proceed-
ing.34 Besides having Section 307(b)(1) limit the time for obtaining 
judicial review of some issues prior to an enforcement proceeding, 
Congress also foreclosed prospective defendants from raising these 
same issues in an enforcement action. Thus, a business emitting a 
hazardous pollutant which fails to bring an action in the court of 
appeals challenging the regulation controlling that pollutant will be 
precluded from raising the validity of the regulation in an enforce-
ment proceeding. 
In sum, Section 307(b) of the Act limits the opportunities for 
judicial review of actions of the Administrator. The restrictions 
under this section foreclose judicial review in the courts of appeals 
sixty days after the Administrator's action, and preclude considera-
the Congress to enact the review provision of the FWPCA was the impetus behind the 
enactment of the Section 307(b) review provision in the Clean Air Act. 
2. The judicial review provision of the Clean Air Act was first interpreted in Getty Oil Co. 
v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3rd.Cir.1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). In this case 
the issue was whether an interested party could seek pre-enforcement review in the federal 
district court under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§2201,1337 (1970), and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§701, 702 (1970). The court held that Section 307 
of the Clean Air Act provided the exclusive means of pre-enforcement review of EPA regula-
tions. 




34 Section 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(2)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(2). 
See note 25, supra, for the full text of §307(b)(2). 
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tion in the district courts at any time, whether in civil or criminal 
enforcement proceedings. 
C. Enforcement Procedures 
Section 113 contains the major provision outlining federal en-
forcement procedures applicable to violations of state ,implementa-
tion plans and standards for hazardous emissions.:II This section 
provides both civil and criminal sanctions. 
The Administrator has authority, under this section, to issue a 
compliance order or to bring a civil action seeking an injunction or 
civil penalty under several circumstances, notably for the violation 
of any applicable state implementation plan or for a violation of a 
standard for hazardous emissions.- Any order issued for any viola-
16 Section 113, 42 U.S.C. §I857c-8 (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. 17413. It should be noted 
that Section 113 is not the only enforcement mechanism in the Clean Air Act. Other sections 
of the Clean Air Act do provide for the imposition of penalties, under limited circumstances 
(e.g., civil penalties may be imposed for the violation of a primary nonferrous smelter order 
(Section 120); an order or injunction may issue for non-conformity with provisions relating 
to prevention of significant deterioration of air quality (Section 167); and, civil penalties may 
be imposed for a violation with respect to a provision for controlling motor vehicle emissions 
(Section 205». 
16 Section 113 (a), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7413(a). Under 
this subsection, the Administrator has the same power with respect to violations of the 
sections relating to new source performance standards, and inspections, monitoring, and 
entry. 
The enforcement procedure of Section 113(b), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(b) (1976) transferred to 
42 U.S.C. §74I3(b), also mandates that the Administrator bring a civil action if the violation 
of any of several provisions is committed by a "major stationary source" as defmed by the 
the Clean Air Act. Section 302, 42 U.S.C. §l857h (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. 17602, 
defines the terms "major stationary source" and "major emitting facility" to mean "any 
stationary facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the potential to emit, 
one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant. . . ." The Administrator is permitted 
to bring an action for any of these same violations when they are committed by a person who 
is not the owner or operator of such a major stationary source. Section 113(b), 42 U.S.C. 
§1857c-8(b)(I976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7413(b). 
The prohibitions for which the Administrator must bring an action in some cases and may 
bring an action in other situations are set forth in Section 113(b), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(b)(1976) 
transferred to 42 U.S.C. §74I3(b), which reads, in pertinent part: 
The Administrator shall, in the case of any person which is the owner or operator of a 
major stationary source . . . commence a civil action . . . whenever such person-
(1) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under subsection (a); 
or 
(2) violates any requirement of an applicable implement plan (A) during any period 
of federally assumed enforcement, or (B) more than 30 days after having been notified 
by the Administrator under subsection (a)(l) of a finding that such person is violating 
such requirement; or 
(3) violates section l11(e) , 112(c) [42 USC 1 7411(e) or 74I2(c)], section 119(g) (as 
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tion, except one issued for a violation of a standard for a hazardous 
pollutant, does not take effect until the person to whom it is issued 
has had an opportunity to confer with the Administrator concerning 
the alleged violation.37 The civil action may be commenced for a 
permanent or temporary injunction, or to recover a civil penalty of 
not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or both.38 Criminal sanc-
tions of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or of imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or both, are mandatorily imposed 
on any person who knowingly violates one of the conditions raised 
in this subsection." 
in effect before the date of the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 
[enacted Aug. 7, 1977]), subsection (d)(5) (relating to coal conversion), section 324 
(relating to cost of certain vapor recovery) [42 USC 0 7624], section 119 (relating to 
smelter orders), [42 USC 0 7419] or any regulation under part B (relating to ozone) 
[42 USC 00 7450 et seq.]; or 
(4) fails or refuses to comply with any requirement of section 114 [42 USC § 7414] or 
subsection (d) of this section; or 
(5) attempts to construct or modify a major stationary source in any area with respect 
to which a finding under subsection (a)(5) has been made. 
The Administrator may commence a civil action for recovery of any noncompliance penalty 
under section 120 [42 USC 0 7420] or for recovery of any nonpayment penalty for which any 
person is liable under section 120 [42 USC § 7420] or for both. Any action under this 
subsection may be brought in the district court of the United States for the district in which 
the violation occurred or in which the defendant resides or has his principal place of business, 
and such court shall have jurisdiction to restrain such violation, to require compliance, to 
assess such civil penalty and to collect any noncompliance penalty (and nonpayment penalty) 
owed under section 120 [42 USC § 7420]. In determining the amount of any civil penalty to 
be assessed under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration (in addition to other 
factors) the size of the business, the economic impact of the penalty on the business, and the 
seriousness of the violation. Notice of the commencement of such action shall be given to the 
appropriate State air pollution control agency. In the case of any action brought by the 
Administrator under this subsection, the court may award costs of litigation (including rea-
sonable attorney and expert witness fees) to the party or parties against whom such action 
was brought in any case wherp 'he court finds that such action was unreasonable . 
." Section 113(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(a)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7413(a). 
sa [d. 
SI Section 113(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(c)(1)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7413(c)(1), 
reads: 
Any person who knowingly-
(A) violates any requirement of an applicable implement plan (i) during any period 
of Federally assumed enforcement, or (ii) more than 30 days after having been notified 
by the Administrator under subsection (a)(l) that such person is violating such re-
quirement, or 
(B) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order under section 119 [42 USC 
§ 7419] or under subsection (a) or (d) of this section, or 
(C) violates section l11(e) [42 USC § 7411(e)], section 112(c) [42 USC § 7412(c)], 
or 
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The Administrator has broad authority to impose civil sanctions 
for violations of various provisions of the Act. For violations other 
than those involving standards for hazardous pollutants, the alleged 
violator may confer with the Administrator prior to the issuance of 
an order against the violator. An order issued for a violation of a 
hazardous pollutant, on the other hand, takes effect upon issuance. 
Furthermore, the Administrator has authority to impose criminal 
sanctions under the Act for any knowing violation of certain condi-
tions. 
III. ADAMO WRECKING CO. v. UNITED STATES 
The recent case of Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States40 ad-
dressed the application of the judicial review procedure of the Clean 
Air Act to a defendant in a criminal enforcement action brought for 
a violation of an emission. standard issued under that same ActY 
The facts of the Adamo case are relatively simple. Adamo, a small 
wrecking company in Michigan, was indicted for failing to comply 
with the regulation issued pursuant to Section 112(c)(1)(B)42 of the 
Act setting an emission standard for asbestos during building demo-
lition.43 Specifically, the government charged the defendant with 
knowingly failing to wet and remove asbestos material from a build-
ing before undertaking its demolition, thereby causing the emission 
of asbestos. 44 From such a seemingly innocuous incident emerged a 
(D) violates any requirement of section 119(g) (as in effect before the date of the 
enactment of this Act [enacted Aug. 7, 1977]), subsection (b)(7) or (d)(5) of section 
120 (relating to noncompliance penalties) [42 USC § 7420(b)(71, (d)(5)], or any re-
quirement of part B (relating to ozone) [42 USC §§ 7450 et seq.] 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment 
for not more than one year, or by both. If the conviction is for a violation committed after 
the first conviction of such person under this paragraph, punishment shall be by a fine of 
not more than $50,000 per day of violation, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, 
or by both. 
'" 434 U.S. 275 (1978) . 
.. [d . 
.. Section 112(c)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7(c)(1)(B)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 
7412(c)(1)(B). See also text at notes 6-15, supra . 
., The indictment charged a violation of 40 C.F.R. §61.22(d)(2)(i)(1975). Section 61.22 is 
designated in its caption as the emission standard for asbestos. Sections 61.20 through 61.25 
are grouped and described as a "National Emission Standard for Asbestos." 40 C.F.R. 
§ §61.20 et seq. (1978). 
II Count one of the indictment is set out in United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 
1, 3 (6th.Cir.1976). 
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major test of the criminal sanctions available under the Clean Air 
Act. 
A. Proceedings in the District Court 
The charge that Adamo Wrecking Company crimirullly violated 
Section 112(c)(1)(B) of the Clean Air Act subjected it to the possi-
bility of a fine, or imprisonment, or both, under Section 
113(c)(1)(C).45 Adamo claimed that it could not be charged with 
such a violation since the asbestos emission standard was not, in 
fact, an emission standard, but rather was a work requirement.48 
Adamo defined emission standard as a quantitative level of pollu-
tants attainable by the use of various procedures.47 Under this defi-
nition, an emission standard addresses solely the level of pollutants, 
and does not encompass the procedures to be used to achieve that 
level. Therefore, failure to adhere to the procedure of removing and 
wetting the asbestos prior to demolition would not constitute a vio-
lation of an emission standard within the meaning of Section 112 
and so not give rise to a criminal penalty under Section 113. 
The government claimed that Section 307(b) of the Act48 deprived 
a federal district court of jurisdiction to address Adamo's attack on 
the regulation." However, the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan found that it had jurisdiction to con-
sider the validity of the regulation. Reasoning that the word 
"promulgating" in Section 307(b)(1) refers more to procedure than 
to substance, the court held that the statute permitted an attack on 
the validity of the standard while, at the same time, it barred an 
attack on the procedure leading to enactment of the standard. 50 The 
court then dismissed the criminal indictment against Adamo after 
having invalidated the asbestos emission standard. 51 
co Section 113(c)(1)(C), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(c)(1)(C)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 
7413(c)(1)(C). See also text at notes 35-39, supra. 
co This action was brought prior to the enactment of the Clean Air Amendments of 1977. 
Under the Amendments, the Administrator is allowed to issue standards in the form of work 
procedures or requirements if it is not feasible to issue the preferred emission standard. 
Section 112(e), 42 U.S.C. §7412(e). However, violations of the work requirements or proce-
dures have not been listed as prohibited acts under Section 112(c), 42 U.S.C. §7412(c), 
presumably due to an oversight on the part of Congress. See also text at notes 13-15, supra. 
41 434 U.S. 275, 286 (1978). 
48 Section 307(b), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(b). The 
relevant portions of this Section are set forth at note 25, supra. 
4. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1978). 
50 United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 1, 4 (6th.Cir.1976). 
Illd. 
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B. The Court of Appeals 
The Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the 
district court's conclusion.52 Instead, the Sixth Circuit found that 
the clear meaning of Section 307(b) deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction to decide the validity of the regulation.53 The court 
stated that, under Section 307(b)(1), Adamo could have challenged 
the emission standard in the court of appeals within sixty days after 
its promulgation if it had chosen to do so; therefore, according to 
Section 307(b)(2), Adamo was precluded from raising the validity 
of the standard as a defense in its criminal trial,54 The appeals court 
pointed out that the Supreme Court had upheld the same type of 
exclusive review provision in the face of a due process attack in 
Yakus v. United States. 55 
Yakus involved a criminal conviction under the Emergency Price 
Control Act5S for wilfully selling wholesale cuts of beef at prices 
above the maximum price prescribed by the regulations of the Off-
ice of Price Administration.57 In that Act, enacted to control the 
effects of war-time inflation, Congress had established a review pro-
cedure for pricing regulations." Judicial review of such regulations 
was available only if an appeal were filed with the Price Administra-
tor within sixty days of their promulgation.5t Those challenging the 
regulations could take subsequent appeals to the Emergency Court 
of Appeals. 80 Since no appeal had been taken of the regulation under 
which Yakus was convicted, the statute barred him from raising the 
question of its validity in his criminal prosecution. 
Yakus claimed on appeal that, if the review procedure of the 
.2 [d . 
• 3 [d. at 6 . 
.. [d . 
.. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). The defendant, charged with a violation of the Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, as amended by the Inflation Control Act of 1942, ch. 
578, 56 Stat. 765, for the wilfull sale of beef at prices above the maximum price prescribed in 
the regulation promulgated pursuant to that Act, was unable to raise the validity of that 
regulation in an enforcement proceeding in a federal district court . 
.. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, as amended by the Inflation 
Control Act of 1942, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765. 
" ,'Petitioners have not contended that they were unaware of the Regulation and the jury 
found that they knowingly violated it within eight days after its issue." Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 435 (1944). 
58 Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, §§203 and 204, 56 Stat. 31. 
51 [d. §203 . 
.. [d. §204. 
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statute were interpreted to preclude a defendant from challenging 
the validity of a regulation, then such an interpretation would not 
meet due process requirements. II This due process issue involved 
three distinct arguments. The first argument claimed that the re-
view procedure failed to ensure due process because the sixty-day 
time period allowed for the filing of a protest with the Price Admin-
istrator was insufficient.'2 The second argument asserted that the 
statute's prohibition barring the entry of an interlocutory injunction 
to stay enforcement of the price regulation before a final adjudica-
tion as to its validity violated due process.83 The final argument 
claimed that the prohibition against raising the issue of the validity 
of a particular regulation during a criminal enforcement proceeding 
violated due process since it did not prevent the conviction of a 
defendant for violating a regulation before the determination of its 
validity. I. 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court first noted that the country's 
entry into World War IT presented a grave danger of war-time infla-
tion, forcing Congress to act expeditiously to develop prompt and 
.1 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 418 (1944). Yakus also claimed that such an 
exclusive review procedure contravenes the Sixth Amendment and that the Act involves an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Price Administrator. 
It is interesting to note that similar review provisions, which alter the jurisdictional frame-
work of trial and appeal typically followed in federal cases, have not been found by the federal 
courts to be unconstitutional when attacked on Article III grounds. Article Ill, §1 of the 
United States Constitution reads, in part: "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to 
time ordain and establish." U.S. CONST. art. III §1. See: Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 
169 F.2d 254 (2d.Cir.1948) (upholding constitutionality of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 
29 U.S.C. §§251-261); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (upholding constitution-
ality of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23); South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding constitutionality of Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
42 U.S.C. §l973 et seq.); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944) (upholding constitution-
ality of Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885); and, Clark v. 
Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (upholding constitutionality ofthe Military Selective Service Act 
of 1967,50 U.S.C. app §451 et seq.). See also, L. Tribe, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978) 
36-47. The author suggests that "it would be a mistake to attach too much significance to 
these decisions" and then analyzes the limits placed on Congress' power to regulate federal 
court jurisdiction. 1d. at 36-37. See also, Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953), reprinted in 
-R. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330-75 (2d. Ed. 1973). 
'2 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 433-34 (1944). 
II 1d . 
.. 1d. 
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consistent means for minimizing price disparities. 85 The procedure 
the Congress enacted, the Court reasoned, satisfied this purpose.8e 
Second, the Court addressed its jurisdiction to determine the valid-
ity of the price control regulation. Initially, it noted that Yakus had 
failed to demonstrate that he had exhausted the administrative 
remedies available under the statute, or that the remedies would 
have been inadequate had he proceeded through the administrative 
processY Then, proceeding to a consideration of the review provi-
sions of the Emergency Price Control Act,88 the Court concluded 
that Congress intended these provisions to be exclusive. By author-
izing the district court to entertain challenges only of the validity 
of the Act itself and not of its particular regulations, Congress "gave 
clear indication that the validity of the Administrator's regulations 
or orders should not be subject to attack in criminal prosecutions 
for their violation, at least before their invalidity had been adjudi-
cated ~y recourse to the protest procedure prescribed by the 
statute."89 This procedure, the Court found, did not violate due 
process since the administrative procedure contained adequate safe-
guards. 70 Consequently, the Court upheld the judicial review proce-
.. [d. at 431-34 . 
.. [d. 
87 [d. at 434 . 
.. Ch. 26, §§203 and 204, 56 Stat. 31 (1942). The administrative and judicial review proce-
dures in the Emergency Price Control Act and the Clean Air Act are similar. The Office of 
Price Administration was charged with implementing and enforcing the Emergency Price 
Control Act. That Act provides a procedure for the issuance, reconsideration, and judicial 
review of the regulations and orders of the Price Administrator. Effective price control in a 
war economy cannot be detained pending formal hearings at the initial promulgation stage. 
Therefore, Congress omitted these hearings prior to the issuance by the Price Administrator 
of regulations or orders. Any person subject to regulations or orders issued under the Act may, 
within sixty days after the issuance of such order or regulation, file a protest with the Admin-
istrator pursuant to §203. The next step in the process for an individual aggrieved by a denial 
of his protest is that of judicial review, provisions for which are found in §204, which creates 
the Emergency Court of Appeals and gives it exclusive jurisdiction, subject to writ of certior-
ari from the Supreme Court, to determine the validity of these regulations or orders. A 
complaint filed with the Emergency Court of Appeals must be submitted within thirty days 
after a protest denial. The Act does not give the Emergency Court authority to issue tempo-
rary injunctions to stay the effectiveness of its judgments pending review in the Supreme 
Court. To do otherwise would be to prevent expeditious administrative action which would 
be in contradiction with the intent of the statute. It should be noted that, although this 
provision prohibits any court other than the Emergency Court from addressing the validity 
of any regulation or order issued under the Emergency Price Control Act, it does not preclude 
review of the constitutionality of the Act itself by any court in an enforcement proceeding . 
.. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 430-31 (1944). 
7. [d. at 433. 
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dure enacted by the Emergency Price Control Act, and affirmed the 
conviction of Yakus. 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found the Yakus case control-
ling in its consideration of Adamo. In both cases, defendants sought 
to utilize criminal enforcement proceedings in order to challenge the 
validity of a regulation promulgated under an act limiting the time 
period and forum for such judicial review. Consequently, based on 
the holding in Yak us, the Court of Appeals remanded the Adamo 
case to the district court solely to determine whether Adamo had 
violated the regulation in question, omitting any consideration of 
the regulation's validity.7J 
C. Supreme Court Opinion 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Ap-
peals.72 The Court held that Adamo could defend itself in the crimi-
nal enforcement proceeding on the ground that the emission stan-
dard which Adamo allegedly violated was not an emission standard 
within the meaning given that term by Congress, but rather was a 
work practice regulation.73 The Court questioned the Administra-
tor's authority, by merely designating a particular regulation an 
emission standard, to conclusively end any further discussion of the 
standard's validity in a criminal enforcement proceeding. 74 After 
noting the variety of sanctions available under the Clean Air Act 
whose applicability depends upon the particular provision or regula-
tion violat~d, the Court reasoned that Congress intended that only 
particular groups of violators - in this case, those who violated emis-
sion standards for hazardous pollutants - would be subject to severe 
criminal penalties and precluded from asserting certain defenses.75 
The stringency of the criminal sanction available for the violation 
of an emission standard reinforced the view that Congress had a 
particular type of regulation in mind when it used that term. Thus, 
although Section 307(b)(2) may preclude judicial review of the va-
71 United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 1 (6th.Cir.1976). 
72 Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978). Chief Justice Burger and 
Justices White, Marshall and Powell joined in the majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist. 
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, joined in the Court's opinion with the understand-
ing that it implied no view as to the constitutionality of the judicial review provision of the 
Clean Air Act in the context of a criminal prosecution. 
73 [d. at 289. 
74 [d. at 284. 
71 [d. at 282. 
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lidity of a particular standard, it cannot relieve the Administrator 
from the burden of proving that the regulation allegedly violated is, 
in fact, an emission standard. 
The majority also noted that, under the review scheme as inter-
preted by the government, small businesses would be forced both 
to peruse the Federal Register daily for proposed regulations applic-
able to their businesses and to be ready to immediately challenge 
any of these regulations in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.7' Moreover, mere publication of a regulation in the Fed-
eral Register may constitute inadequate notice to a party who may 
later become a defendant in a criminal enforcement proceeding.77 
Such considerations warrant giving a defendant at least a limited 
opportunity to challenge a regulation when criminally charged with 
its violation. 
However, the Court cautioned that the scope of a federal district 
court's review of a regulation's validity involves only the narrow 
question of whether the regulation on its face constitutes an emis-
sion standard within the broad definitional limits set by Congress.78 
Under this holding, Section 307(b)(2) still precludes district courts 
from reviewing the administrative procedures used in the promulga-
tion of the regulation. Questions concerning whether the regulation 
is arbitrary, capricious, or supported by the record remain beyond 
the scope of review. 78 
Mter determining that the district court had jurisdiction to ad-
dress Adamo's attack on the validity of the asbestos emission regu-
lation, the Court confirmed the district court's conclusion that the 
regulation did not, as the government asserted, constitute an emis-
sion standard. While acknowledging that, ordinarily, deference to 
the agency interpretation is appropriate,80 the Court referred to the 
Clean Air Amendments of 197781 as lending support to its conclu-
7. The severity of the scheme is accentuated by the fact that persons subject to the Act, 
including innumerable small businesses, may protect themselves against arbitrary admin-
istrative action only by daily perusal of proposed emission standards in the Federal Regis-
ter and by immediate initiation of litigation in the District of Columbia to protect their 
interests. 
Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275, 283 n.2 (1978). 
77 [d. at 289 (Powell, J., concurring). 
78 [d. at 285. 
71 [d. 
110 [d. at 288. 
8' The Clean Air Amendments of 1977 added subsection (e) to Section 112, 42 U.S.C. 
§7412(e). See also text at notes 13-15, supra. 
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sion. Those Amendments permit the Administrator of EPA to pro-
mulgate operational standards if it is not feasible to promulgate or 
enforce emission standards.82 Obviously, this implies that Congress 
intended emission standards to entail numerical limitations rather 
than work procedures. Consequently, the Supreme Court invalida-
ted the asbestos emission standard and reinstated the district 
court's dismissal of the criminal indictment.83 
In dissent, Justice Stewart84 criticized the Court's analysis as con-
trary to legislative intent.1I5 Despite the unambiguous wording of 
Section 307(b) precluding judicial review of the validity of emission 
standards, the majority nevertheless held that a district court may 
inquire into whether the Administrator of EPA has acted beyond his 
statutory authority. in promulgating the regulation. According to 
Justice Stewart, such in inquiry into the scope of the Administra-
tor's authority encompasses a large part of what the judicial review 
of agency action entails.88 Since Section 307(b) expressly forbids 
trial courts from conducting such a review, the majority's holding 
would seemingly destroy the unified, expedited process Congress 
established under the Clean Air Act.87 
The narrow holding of the Adamo opinion does not even reach the 
Yakus constitutional issue concerning whether the judicial review 
requirements of Section 307(b) violate due process by precluding a 
defendant from questioning the validity of a regulation in a criminal 
enforcement proceeding. The defendant in Adamo apparently did 
not raise the constitutionality of the judicial review provision as a 
defense, focusing instead on the definition of the term emission 
standard.88 One justice suggested that Adamo may have thought the 
Yakus decision precluded further discussion of the due process 
issue.8' 
However, the Yakus case is distinguishable from Adamo on sev-
eral grounds. First, Congress enacted the Emergency Price Control 
Act during war-time. The necessity for its stringent review proce-
82 Id . 
.. Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. ,275, 289 (1978) . 
.. Id. at 291. Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined in the dissent. 
"Id. 
81 Id. 
87 Id. at 292. 
81 Id. at 277-78. 
II Id. at 290 (Powell, J., concurring). 
-----------~-
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dure arose due to the overriding public interest in preventing infla-
tion during World War II.'"' Such a national emergency as war is 
readily distinguishable from the problems of air pollution; although 
of significant national concern, the pollution problem certainly does 
not pose the same threat to the immediate well-being of the nation. 
Second, the defendant in Yakus had actual knowledge of the applic-
able regulation in sufficient time to challenge its appropriateness, 
although he chose not to do SO,,1 However, in Adamo, the defendant 
did not have actual knowledge of the regulation until more than ten 
months after the regulation's promulgation.82 Third, the Emergency 
Price Control Act in Yakus named the Emergency Court of Appeals 
as the only forum in which any actions taken by the Price Adminis-
trator could be challenged.83 On the other hand, the Clean Air Act 
permits the validity of regulations to be challenged in any court of 
appeals which possesses the proper jurisdiction. t4 
Thus, the Yakus holding does not automatically preclude discus-
sion of whether the judicial review provisions of Section 307 (b) com-
port with the constitutional requirements of due process when ap-
plied to a defendant in a criminal enforcement proceeding. The 
majority opinion and the dissenting opinion by Justice Stewart, 
both of which address the scope of judicial review under Section 
307(b), raise an issue which deserves further consideration. There-
fore, an investigation of due process considerations under the Clean 
Air Act is appropriate. 
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
A. Judicial Response: Procedural Due Process 
Although the exclusive review provision found in the Clean Air 
Act serves an important public interest, its interpretation cannot 
infringe the due process rights of an individual defendant.85 Section 
eo See text at note 65, supra. 
II See note 57, supra . 
• 2 The regulation Adamo was charged with violating was promulgated April 6, 1973. 38 Fed. 
Reg. 8826. The indictment against Adamo alleged a violation occurring on or about February 
19, 1974. United States v. Adamo Wrecking Co., 545 F.2d 1, 3 (6th. Cir. 1976). Adamo was 
unable to challenge the regulation within the sixty day time limit since it was not notified of 
the regulation's existence until approximately ten months after its promulgation. 
" Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, §204, 56 Stat. 311. 
I< Section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(1)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) . 
.. "In order to protect public health effectively Congress provided that such [state imple-
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307(b) does present potential impediments for the criminal defen-
dant in contesting an enforcement prosecution under the Act, and, 
therefore, may violate due process. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that "no person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . . .... By providing a limitation on 
government action, whether arbitrary or legitimate, procedural due 
process seeks to protect individual freedom.'7 The evolutionary pro-
cess of developing procedural safeguards and defining the interests 
protected by the Due Process Clause has utilized broad general 
principles concerning fundamental fairness.1S Currently, the Su-
preme Court employs a due process standard that is "flexible and 
calls for such procedural protections as the situation demands. "UI 
Analysis basically focuses on four loo distinct factors: (1) the nature 
mentation] plans, after fair allowance for due process, be enforceable. For these reasons §307 
has been upheld as a bastion of enforceability." Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 
34 (2d.Cir. 1977). See also, Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976); Oljato Chapter 
of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir.1975). 
" U.S. CONST. amend V. The states are similarly binded by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution: "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
t7 "[Due Process] is a restraint on the legislature as well as on the executive and judicial 
power of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free to make any 
process 'due process of law,' by its mere will." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improve-
meht Company, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1856). 
" Due process protects "those fundamental principals of liberty and justice which lie at 
the base of all our civil and political institutions .... " Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 
535 (1884). Due i!roceS8 denotes "those privileges long recognized at common law as essential 
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
See generally, Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication - A Survey and 
Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957), in which the author terms the apparent inconsistency of 
Supreme Court decisions on due process requirements a "chaotic array." 
During the late 1950's and early 1960's, due process had been analyzed by stressing a 
utilitarian formulation which consists of an examination of the individual's rights or interests 
along with the government's interest and function. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also; L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 539-43 (1978) suggesting that the balancing test of the major-
ity and the individual, the commonly used method at present to determine the due process 
requirement, is inadequate to afford protection. 
Under the utilitarian formulation, the minimum procedural safeguards consistent with due 
process in each situation are dependent upon the nature of the governmental function in-
volved and the nature of the private interest which is affected by the governmental action. 
See, Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), cited with approval 
in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970). 
" Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976), quoting Morrissey v Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 
481 (1972). 
,. The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), enumerated three factors in the 
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of the private interest; (2) the government's interest, including its 
actual duty in executing the procedure and the burden that an 
alternative procedural requirement would impose; (3) the risk that 
an erroneous deprivation of the private interest may arise due to the 
procedures employed; and, (4) the probable value, if any, of other 
procedural safeguards. lol By balancing these factors in the light of 
each individual case, the Court determines whether a given proce-
dure satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. 
1. The Private Interest 
The first factor used in this balancing test concerns the nature of 
the private interest involved. Certainly each defendant in a criminal 
enforcement proceeding under Section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act 
has a substantial private interest at stake. Not only is an accused 
subject to deprivation of life and liberty due to the possibility of 
imprisonment for up to one year, but also is subject to the depriva-
tion of property through the imposition of a fine of up to $25,000 per 
day per violation. loz 
2. The Governmental Interest 
The second factor in the Supreme Court's due process balancing 
test concerns the public or governmental interest furthered by the 
procedure in question, including the actual duty which the govern-
ment fulfills by executing the procedure and the burden which the 
adoption of an alternate procedure would entail. As enuneiated in 
the Clean Air Act, the government has a duty "to protect and en-
hance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the 
public and welfare and the productive capacity of its population 
• • • • "103 Fulfilling this duty necessarily involves the enforcement 
of the regulations and procedures promulgated under the Clean Air 
Act. Furthermore, these regulations and procedures indicate the 
Congressional intent to provide for efficient and uniform decision-
procedural due process test by focusing on the governmental and private interests involved, 
a8 well as on the "fairness and reliability of the existing. . . procedures, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional procedural safeguards." [d. at 343. For purposes of analysis, the 
third factor in the Mathews test is broken down into two components: the reliability of 
existing procedures and the probable value of other safeguards. 
,., [d. at 135. 
,.2 Section 113(c), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-8(c)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7413(c). 
103 Section 101, 42 U.S.C. §l857 (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7401. 
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making, a requirement necessary to prevent further environmental 
degradation and enhance air resources on a national scale. lo4 
3. The Risk of an Erroneous Deprivation 
The third factor used in establishing minimum due process safe-
guards addresses the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private 
interest at stake. One fundamental tenet of due process developed 
in order to prevent just such a deprivation requires that there be 
notice and an opportunity for a hearing prior to any significant 
governmental deprivation. lo5 For example, procedural due process 
requires that an accused have a right to defend him/herself against 
the government's accusations in a fair trial,l08 including the oppor-
tunity for an open hearing in one's own defense, and the opportunity 
to cross-examine witnesses, offer testimony, and be represented by 
counsel. I07 Yet, not all deprivations require the full panoply of due 
process sageguards. For example, welfare recipients may be denied 
benefits in administrative rather than judicial proceedings, pro-
vided they have notice and an opportunity to be heard. lOS Thus, the 
procedures mandated by due process will vary from case to case. 
In addition, due process requires merely that the necessary proce-
dures be provided at some stage of the proceedings leading to the 
ultimate deprivation of a private interest. lot The legislature may 
constitutionally limit the scope of review at successive stages, 
thereby forcing a party to exhaust his remedies before proceeding 
further with his complaint. 
Arguably, Congress has the authority to limit the opportunity to 
challenge regulations under the Clean Air Act to that permitted by 
the procedure set out in Section 307(b), which restricts both the 
time period and forum for such challenges. Indeed, the district 
courts have indicated their intention to adhere to the restrictive 
review procedure of Section 307(b) by refusing to accept jurisdiction 
, .. See note 28, supra. See generally, Section ll(B), supra. 
'06 "Due process requires. . . that there shall be notice and opportunity for hearing given 
the parties .... [these conditions] ... seem to be universally prescribed in all systems of 
law established by civilized countries." Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908). 
See also, In He Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The right is also present in civil proceedings. See, 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
'" See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
"' See In He Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
, •• See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
,ot 1d. 
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to address claims which appropriately should have been raised in 
the courts of appeals. IIO This posture indicates the courts' willing-
ness to force the exhaustion of all available remedies set forth in 
Section 307 (b). However, such a holding does not necessarily answer 
the question whether forcing the exhaustion of remedies violates 
procedural due process in the context of a criminal proceeding. In 
that situation, a defendant would be unable to secure review of 
administrative action in a district court if such action could pro-
perly have been challenged in the court of appeals. 
Only one appellate court has ruled on this issue with respect to 
the Clean Air Act. In Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus,111 the 
defendant oil company applied for an injunction and a temporary 
restraining order in the district court to stay the effect of a compli-
ance order issued by the EPA Administrator. lIZ The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the 
complaint, since Section 307(b) precludes such pre-enforcement 
review where the oil company had failed to make timely appeal to 
the Court of Appeals challenging the Administrator's approval of 
the state implementation plan under which the order was issued.1I3 
After explaining the complicated procedural history preceding the 
institution of the suit, the court stated that the oil company's failure 
to make a timely appeal did not arise due to any lack of sufficient 
notice or hearing.1I4 Rather, the court noted that, since the company 
"chose" to seek a restraining order in the state court rather than 
bring an action in the court of appeals challenging the state plan, 
the company's constitutional right to the opportunity for a due pro-
cess hearing prior to the imposition of criminal sanctions had been 
satisfied. lIs Thus, the defendant's knowledge of its remedies and its 
conscious choice not to rely upon them satisfied procedural due 
process requirements. 
"' See, e.g., Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Stauffer Chemical Company, 367 
F.Supp 1040 (D.DeI.1973); Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F.Supp 1061 
(N.D.W.Va.1973). 
III 467 F.2d 349 (3rd.Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1125 (1973). 
112 [d. at 355. 
113 [d. at 356-59. 
114 [d. at 357. See also, Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th.Cir.1973) (Assum-
ing state hearings were adequate and that the Administrator reviewed those hearings prior 
to approving the state implementation plan, then the Administrator's procedure of not afford-
ing a hearing on his part prior to approval of the state plans does not offend due process). 
III Getty Oil Company v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 356 (3rd.Cir.1972), cert. denied 409 
U.S. 1125 (1973). 
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However, the Getty Oil case does not conclusively determine 
whether requiring criminal defendants to exhaust their procedural 
remedies may be consistent with due process in all enforcement 
proceedings. The appeals court particularly noted that the oil com-
pany had ample notice of the review procedures and voluntarily 
chose to disregard them in place of a state remedy.t" Thus, under 
Getty Oil a criminal defendant may properly be precluded from 
later asserting a remedy which he had previously failed to exhaust 
only if two factors are present: (a) the defendant had prior, actual 
knowledge of the available remedy and (b) the defendant voluntar-
ily waived his opportunity to exercise it. 
In the Adamo case, the defendant lacked prior, actual knowledge 
of the existence of the regulation which it was charged with violating 
and, consequently, failed to raise an appropriate challenge in the 
court of appeals pursuant to Section 307(b). \17 Therefore, since 
Adamo lacked actual knowledge, it should not be precluded from 
challenging the regulation in its later criminal prosecution. 
Because Adamo did not have prior knowledge of its available 
remedies under Section 307(b), it could not have voluntarily waived 
them. However, if it had known of their existence, failure to chal-
lenge the asbestos regulation in the court of appeals would probably 
have constituted a waiver of that remedy.1I8 Yet such a conclusion 
is not necessarily compelled. Although the Supreme Court has rec-
II' [d. at 356-57. 
111 See text at note 92, supra. 
III In 1977, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals characterized the failure to exhaust avail-
able remedies by not petitioning for review within the specified time period as a waiver of 
the defendant's right. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d.Cir.1977), cert. denied 
sub nom. Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). The court was addressing a 
citizen suit brought under the Clean Air Act to enforce the metropolitan control plan of New 
York City. The court held that the City was precluded in an enforcement proceeding from 
raising the issue of whether enforcement of the plan violated its Tenth Amendment rights 
by interfering with its governmental functions since such an issue was reviewable under 
Section 307(b)(I). The court reasoned that, "since the City could have advanced its present 
contentions by way of a petition for review of the Administrator's approval of the [New York 
state implementation] Plan in 1973 and chose instead voluntarily to commit itself to enforce-
ment of the Plan, we hold that the City has waived its right to assert these contentions. . . 
in an enforcement proceeding .... " [d. at 35. The court stressed in its opinion that the 
waiver by the City was voluntary and made knowingly. [d. See also, Granite City Steel Co. 
v. EPA, 501 F.2d 925 (7th.Cir.1974). The steel company's petition for review of an EPA 
regulation promulgating interim compliance schedules to further the state implementation 
plan was dismissed. "The Company deliberately bypassed a change to litigate the reasonable-
ness of the endpoint. In these circumstances any harshness is irrelevant. . . ." [d. at 927. 
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ognized that due process protections may be waived under some 
circumstances, III a waiver will not be presumed. l20 The court must 
be satisfied that the waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, 
with an awareness of the future consequences. 121 Moreover, if new 
information has appeared since the lapse of the sixty day period 
allowed by Section 307(b) for initiating suits to contest Clean Air 
Act regulations, the courts will not hold later challenges to be time-
barred. l22 Therefore, failure to initiate proceedings during the allot-
ted time may not absolutely be deemed a waiver and bar later 
judicial review. 
The ability of criminal defendants to seek review of administra-
tive actions without having first complied with a statutorily-
mandated review procedure has arisen in other situations. One ex-
ample of a judicial review procedure which requires the prior ex-
haustion of all available remedies is found in the processes under 
the Selective Service Acts. 123 In Falbo v. United States,124 the Su-
preme Court upheld the procedure in the Selective Training and 
Service Act of 1940125 requiring compliance with the administrative 
process before seeking judicial review .128 To allow preinduction judi-
cial review, the Court reasoned, would permit litigious interruption 
of a "mobilization system which Congress established by the Act 
II. See e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). 
120 In addressing the applicability of a waiver of a jury trial, the Court required that "courts 
indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Insurance Company v. Ken-
nedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937). 
121 "Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, 
intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-
quences." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). This standard has been presumed 
to be the same for noncriminal as well as criminal proceedings. D.H. Overmyer Co., Inc. v. 
Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972). 
122 Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C.Cir.1975). It should be noted 
that the Clean Air Amendments of 1977 extend the time period in which to file for review in 
the courts of appeals from thirty to sixty days. See note 25, supra. 
123 The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885, and the Military 
Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app §451 et seq. (1976). 
124 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
12. Ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885. 
128 Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944). Falbo was charged with wilfully failing to 
obey an order to report for work of national importance after his local draft board had 
classified him a conscientious objector. He argued that refusal to obey the order was not a 
crime since the order itself was based on an erroneous classification and was, therefore, 
mistaken. The Supreme Court affirmed Falbo's conviction, noting that he had failed to 
exhaust his remedies by failing to report for the last step in the induction process and, 
therefore, was not entitled to review. 
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[and which] is designed to operate as one continuous process for 
the selection of men for national service."127 The Court similarly 
denied preinduction judicial review under the Military Selective 
Service Act of 1967. 128 
Although the judicial review procedure under the Selective Serv-
ice Acts is analogous to that under the Clean Air Act, the judicial 
interpretation of those draft procedures do not necessarily control 
in the pollution control context. First, under the Selective Service 
Acts, the inductee always has the opportunity to raise his objections 
as a defense in a criminal enforcement proceeding.t29 However, 
under the Clean Air Act, a defendant may not raise defenses in an 
enforcement proceeding, but may only object to administrative reg-
ulations by filing a petition for review in the court of appeals. ISO 
Second, the individual inductee has actual knowledge of the review 
procedure since the entire induction process deals with him person-
ally and on an individual basis. 131 On the other hand, a potential 
defendant in an enforcement proceeding under the Clean Air Act 
receives no personal notification of the promulgation of a particular 
regulation, and indeed, may be totally unaware of its existence until 
the commencement of a criminal enforcement proceeding.132 Given 
these differences, the affirmance of the exhaustion of remedies doc-
trine in the selective service area does not necessarily require the 
same conclusion for proceedings under the Clean Air Act. 
In sum, due process requires the provision of an opportunity for 
notice and a hearing in order to prevent the erroneous deprivation 
of a private interest. However, the legislature need not permit the 
assertion of the full panoply of due process procedures at each stage 
of a proceeding, but can require a party to exhause his remedies at 
each successive stage. Yet a party will not be required to exhaust 
his remedies if he did not have prior actual knowledge of their exist-
ence or did not waive his opportunity to exercise them. Under the 
121 [d. at 552. 
12' 50 U.S.C. app §451 et seq. (1976). See, Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968) (per 
curiam). 
121 See Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946); 
Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
138 See Section II(B), supra. 
131 See, e.g., Clark v. Gabriel, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 
(1946); Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944). 
132 See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978) and the discussion 
of the notice issue at note 92, supra. 
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Clean Air Act, a defendant in a criminal enforcement. proceeding 
may not' question the validity of a regulation if he did not institute 
proceedings challenging its validity within sixty days after its pro-
mulgation. Although such a procedure may comport with due pro-
cess as applied to defendants with actual knowledge of the promul-
gation of a regulation who waived their opportunity for judicial 
review, it cannot bar such defendants as Adamo, who lacked actual 
knowledge and who did not waive their due process rights, from 
challenging the validity of the regulation in criminal enforcement 
proceedings. 
4. Other Procedural Safeguards 
The fourth factor utilized by the Supreme Court in its due process 
balancing test assesses the probable value of any alternative proce-
dural safeguards which may exist. However, the availability and 
usefulness of other procedural safeguards under the Clean Air Act 
depend upon what type of administrative action is being challenged. 
For example, the procedure involved in promulgating emission stan-
dards for hazardous pollutants differs from that for promulgating 
national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. 133 
Therefore, general statements about the viability of any given alter-
native procedures are difficult to make. 
In developing standards to control hazardous pollutants, the 
Administrator must hold a public hearing,l34 presumably to allow 
interested parties the opportunity to challenge the appropriateness 
of the proposed regulation or even the need for any type of regula-
tion at all. However, the Administrator's duty at such hearings is 
narrowly limited only to the issue of whether a particular pollutant 
is a hazardous pollutant; his sole function is to prescribe appropri-
ate standards "unless he finds, on the basis of information presented 
at such hearings, that such pollutant clearly is not a hazardous air 
pollutant. "las Indeed, the hearing does not even address the appro-
priateness of the level or the method of control prescribed by the 
regulation, and the Administrator need not base his decision regard-
ing such matters on any evidence submitted at the hearings. 138 Con-
133 See Section ll(A), supra. 
IS< Section 112, 42 U.S.C. §1857c-7 (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7412. 
I .. rd. 
I" rd. 
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sequently, a public hearing with the Administrator fails to provide 
adequate procedural safeguards to an interested party challenging 
a regulation to control hazardous pollutants. 
On the other hand, the procedure used in promulgating national 
primary and secondary ambient air quality standardsl37 may pro-
vide the requisite procedural safeguards. The procedure requires the 
Administrator to offer a reasonable time for interested persons to 
submit written comments on the published information concerning 
proposed standards. 13s After finalization of the standards, the states 
utilize them in formulating implementation plans, during the for-
mation of which there is also public notice and a hearing. These 
state hearings and notice procedures provide an adequate opportun-
ity for interested persons to offer their views and question the valid-
ity of the Administrator's standards. Therefore, even though Sec-
tion 307(b) forecloses a challenge to the Administrator's action in a 
criminal enforcement proceeding, the state hearings may provide a 
potential defendant with an ample opportunity to raise such a chal-
lenge prior to the enforcement proceeding. 
Thus, adequate alternative procedural safeguards are not always 
available to potential polluters. In situations involving hazardous 
pollutants, for example, a business emitting hazardous pollutants 
is unable to offer its views on the proposed standards for such pollu-
tants prior to their promulgation. A business emitting nonhazardous 
pollutants, on the other hand, does have the opportunity to question 
the appropriateness of the proposed standards for those pollutants. 
However, a question still remains in this situation concerning 
whether the opportunity to voice objections to the promulgation of 
standards for such nonhazardous pollutants is adequate to assure 
due process. 
Applying the four factors utilized in the Supreme Court's balanc-
ing test to the due process issue in Adamo, the individual's interest 
in challenging the validity of a regulation during a criminal enforce-
ment proceeding arguably outweighs the government's interest in 
efficient enforcement of the pollution control laws. Clearly, the gov-
ernmental interest in controlling air pollution throughout the nation 
is significant. However, the risk of an erroneous deprivation in a 
\37 Sections 108 and 109, 42 u.s.c. §§1857c-3, 1857c-4 (1976) transferred to 42 u.s.c. 
§§7408, 7409. 
'3' Section 109(a), 42 U.S.C. §1857c-4(a)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §§7409(a). 
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criminal enforcement proceeding is similarly significant since Sec-
tion 307(b)(2) precludes the defendant from raising all available 
defenses. Furthermore, alternate methods of assuring due process 
protection are not always provided in the administrative procedure. 
When these conclusions are balanced against the fundamental right 
of an accused to be afforded due process protection in a criminal 
proceeding, the individual right, at least arguably, outweighs any 
interest of the government. If this analysis were accepted, then Sec-
tion 307(b)(2) of the Clean Air Act, which precludes raising certain 
defenses in criminal enforcement proceedings, would be struck 
down by the courts as violative of due process. 
However, if the governmental interest were held to be of para-
mount concern, the balance would tip in favor of the government's 
regulatory scheme. Furthermore, if a defendant were presumed to 
have knowledge of the review procedure, the failure to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies would not be characterized as an inadvertent 
waiver of due process protections, and the existing procedures would 
be adequate to assure due process. Nevertheless, even ifthese proce-
dures were not held to be violative of due process, they do impose 
harsh results on a criminal defendant who is unable to raise in the 
district court certain challenges which could have been raised in the 
court of appeals. To alleviate the unfairness of this situation, legis-
lative change in the procedure may be appropriate. 
B. Legislative Response: Statutory Changes 
In 1944, the Congress chose to amend the Emergency Price Con-
trol Actl3' in order to lessen the stringency of its restrictions despite 
the Supreme Court's Yakus decision holding that its exclusive re-
view provision was not violative of due process. 140 Amendments to 
131 Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942). 
uo The Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-383, §101, 58 Stat. 632, 
approved June 30, 1944, effective July I, 1944. 
While the constitutionality of the exclusive jurisdiction provisions of the Statute have 
been upheld by the Supreme Court (Yakus v. United States), the committee is of the 
opinion that these provisions should be relaxed to the fullest extent consistent with the 
effective administration and enforcement of the Act. 
H.R. REp. No. 1593, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1944). See also, the Report of the Special 
Committee on Administrative Law, reprinted in 68 REPORTS OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION 249 (1943) for a brief discussion of some of the crucial elements of the review 
procedure and protection of the Emergency Price Control Act. The Special Committee posits 
that the statutory scheme for such review may be only an illusion. [d. at 251. 
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the Clean Air Act similar to those added to the Emergency Price 
Control Act may prove effective in avoiding any harshness in the 
review procedures of that Act. 
Congress changed the Emergency Price Control Act in order to 
permit a person subject to a regulation or order to challenge its 
validity "at any time" instead of only "within a period of sixty 
days" after its issuance.141 Moreover, Congress permitted a stay of 
enforcement proceedings while the validity of the regulation was 
being tested. 142 In fact, the only restraint imposed on the defendant's 
ability to challenge the validity of a regulation was the requirement 
that there be sufficient reason for the defendant's failure to make 
the challenge within sixty days after its promulgation. These 
amendments effectively preserved Congress' basic intent to provide 
uniform decision-making in the special Emergency Court of Ap-
peals, while also allowing the defendant an opportunity to challenge 
the validity of a regulation or order at any time, even during an 
enforcement proceeding. The fact that Congress altered the review 
provisions as the war was drawing to a close, even when the same 
provisions had been upheld by the Supreme Court, indicates that 
Congress was concerned that the review procedure satisfy the due 
process rights of aggrieved individuals during peacetime. 
Congress should amend the Clean Air Act in 'order to preserve its 
goal of providing efficient and uniform judicial decision-making 
while, at the same time, relieving an accused of the inability to raise 
all defenses in a criminal enforcement proceeding. Two changes in 
Section 307 of the Act are needed. First, Section 307(b)(1) should 
be amended to allow challenges of administrative actions to be 
made either (a) within sixty days after the implementation of such 
actions, or (b) at any time, provided there is a reasonable excuse for 
not bringing a challenge within the sixty day time limitation. Con-
'" Stabilization Extension Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-383, §106, 58 Stat. 638. 
'" Id. at §107(b), 58 Stat. at 639. This section allows the defendant to apply to the court 
in which the proceeding is pending for leave to file a complaint against the Price Administra-
tor in the Emergency Court of Appeals setting forth objections to the validity of any provi-
sions which the defendant has allegedly violated. The court, in which the proceeding is 
pending, 
Id. 
shall grant such leave with respect to any objection which it finds is made in good faith 
and with respect to which it finds there is reasonable and substantial excuse for the 
defendant's failure to present such objection in a protest filed in accordance with section 
203(a). 
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sequently, a person unaware of the existence of a regulation within 
sixty days after its promulgation may still be able to challenge its 
validity.143 Moreover, a petition challenging the regulation's validity 
would still be filed in the appropriate court of appeals, thereby 
preserving uniformity in the development of the case law interpret-
ing the Clean Air Act. 
The second change needed in Section 307 concerns the granting 
of stays. Where a statutory timetable exists, courts have been reluc-
tant to stay proceedings solely on the future possibility of harm to 
the parties seeking the stay; 144 moreover, the Clean Air Act explicitly 
forbids issuing stays during proceedings to impose noncompliance 
penalties. I .. Incorporating the concept of granting stays into Section 
141 Whether an individual's lack of awareness of a particular regulation's promulgation may 
constitute a "reasonable excuse" would, of course, be subject to the court of appeals' determi-
nation on a case by case basis. For example, a small business or an individual may have a 
reasonable excuse for not knowing of the regulation's existence while, on the other hand, a 
large business, with staff attorneys specifically hired to address environmental iBBues affect-
ing the business, may not have such a reasonable excuse. 
144 See e.g., Ohio Environmental Council v. United States District Court, Etc., 565 F.2d 
393 (6th.Cir.I977). In this case an environmental organization petitioned the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit to issu a writ of mandamus directing the district court to order the utility 
company to comply with the state implementation plan. The district court had previously 
stayed the EPA's enforcement proceeding against the utility company until that company 
had the opportunity to contest the EPA's approval of the state implementation plan under 
Section 307(b)(I). 42 U.S.C. §1857h-5(b)(I)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(I). While 
the court of appeals recognized that each court had the power to stay proceedings at its own 
discretion even if its jurisdiction is limited by Section 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §1857h-
5(b)(2) (1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(2), it also cautioned that a court, in issuing 
such a stay, "should be particularly hesitant when, as here, the stay will disrupt a statutory 
or administrative timetable." ld. at 396. Furthermore, the court noted that the party seeking 
the stay has the burden of demonstrating that neither the party nor the public will suffer 
harm from such an order and that there is a pressing need for the delay. The court found 
that the utility company had failed to meet its burden and had failed to bring an action under 
Section 307(b)(l) challenging the plan within the time allowed. The district court had no 
reason for granting the stay other than the pOBBibility that sometime in the future there may 
be a review proceeding. Therefore, the court held the granting of the stay to be an abuse of 
discretion. The court refused to addreBB the utility company's argument that enforcement 
would deny it a due process hearing because, even if a Section 307(b)(l) hearing was unavaila-
ble, there was no showing that the company had no other opportunity to voice its objections 
to the emiBBion limitations such as the requirements under Section 110(a)(I), 42 U.S.C. 
§l857c-5(a)(I)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(I), with respect to proper notice and 
hearing in the formulation of the state implementation plan. 
See also, Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310 (1977)(application for stay of an 
enforcement proceeding, pending determination of the petition for certiorari, denied); Friends 
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d.Cir.1977), cert. denied sub nom. Beame v. Friends of 
the Earth, 434 U.S. 902 (1977). 
141 Section 307(g), 42 U.S.C. §l857h-5(g)(1976) transferred to 42 U.S.C. §7607(g), reads: 
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307 would reduce the harshness of the present scheme. The stay of 
an enforcement proceeding would be granted in order to permit the 
accused to petition the court of appeals for review of the agency 
action, and would remain in effect until the court of appeals makes 
its determination. That determination would, of course, bind the 
district court in the enforcement proceeding. Although granting 
stays could slow the administrative process under the Clean Air Act, 
a short delay would not unduly disrupt the regulatory and enforce-
ment scheme. Moreover, district courts would grant stays only in 
limited circumstances after a proper showing of necessity. 
In sum, these two changes in Section 307 of the Clean Air Act 
would protect an accused's due process rights while at the same 
time allowing judicial review to occur in the courts of appeals. Ac-
cording to these proposed changes, a business or individual with no 
actual knowledge of the enforcement and review procedures of the 
Clean Air Act or the content of the Federal Register would not be 
deprived of an opportunity to challenge the validity of an adminis-
trative action. After receiving notice of a criminal charge and viola-
tion, a defendant would be able to request the district cout hearing 
the enforcement proceeding to stay the litigation until the court of 
appeals properly determines the validity of the administrative ac-
tion in question. This request would be granted only if there were 
sufficient reason for the defendant's failure to challenge the action 
within the sixty day time limit. The business would then file a 
petition for review in the appropriate court of appeals challenging 
the validity of the administrative action. The decision rendered by 
the court of appeals would bind the district court. Thus, while a 
defendant would still be precluded from raising certain defenses in 
the district court under Section 307(b)(2), the defendant would nev-
ertheless be able to raise those same defenses in the court of appeals. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The exclusive judicial review procedure found in the Clean Air 
Act requires that challenges to many administrative actions be 
brought in the court of appeals within sixty days after the date of 
the action. After the expiration of sixty days, any challenge which 
In any action respecting the promulgation of regulations under section 120 [42 u.s.c. 
§7420] of this title or the administration or enforcement of section 120 [42 U.S.C. § 7420] 
of this title no court shall grant any stay, injunctive, or similar relief before final judgment 
by such court in such action. 
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could have been made under this provision may not be raised in any 
subsequent proceeding or in a different forum. Therefore, the review 
procedure effectively precludes defendants from raising all available 
defenses in a criminal prosecution in the district court which could 
have been raised in the court of appeals during the permitted time 
period. 
The procedures of the Clean Air Act relating to the promulgation, 
judicial review, and enforcement of hazardous emission standards 
as well as of primary and secondary ambient air quality standards 
indicate the congressional intent to preserve the nation's air quality 
through expeditious and uniform decision-making. A question 
raised by these procedures concerns whether they comport with 
minimal due process requirements. The Supreme Court, in Adamo, 
did not address whether these provisions violate due process when 
applied to a criminal defendant in an enforcement proceeding. In 
the future, however, these procedures may be struck down by the 
courts if it is determined that the accused is denied fundamental 
due process rights. Furthermore, the legislature may alleviate any 
unfairness in these procedures by amending the judicial review pro-
vision of the Clean Air Act. Preserving the individual's fundamental 
rights in a criminal enforcement proceeding amply justifies amend-
ing the Clean Air Act, particularly when such amendments do not 
detract from the purpose and function of the Act itself. 
